DUCH’S SLAVE LABOR CAMP

Observing the ECCC. Daily Report; please visit: www.cambodiatribunal.org
DUCH’S SLAVE LABOR CAMP
June 24, 2009

By Laura MacDonald, Member of the New York Bar and Consultant to the Center
for International Human Rights, Northwestern University School of Law

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“Re-Education” at Prey Sar

Today, Kaing Guek Eav (alias Duch) answered questions from the Trial Chamber
regarding operations at Prey Sar, another secret detention facility under
Duch’s authority better known as S-24.

Although S-24 has been referred to throughout the proceedings as a
“re-education camp,” Duch made clear today that re-education was merely a
façade and S-24 was in fact a slave labor camp contributing to the Communist
Party of Kampuchea (CPK) policy of extermination. While the number of S-24
detainees is unclear and will likely remain so, out of many hundreds or
thousands detained there, only thirty were released – military combatants
sent back to their unit. All others were eventually sent to Tuol Sleng
prison (S-21) or the killing fields at Choeung Ek where they were tortured
and killed.

While those sent to S-21 were established “enemies” of the CPK to be
smashed, those sent to S-24 were considered “elements” because it was
unclear if they were enemies or friends. The CPK logic seems to have been
that such people of unclear status should be sent to forced labor camps to
be put to work and monitored to ensure they would not cause any issues for
the CPK. Elements sent to S-24 were often wives, children, or other
relatives of those sent to S-21. They were not told the reasons for their
detention or given a chance to contest it.

Elements were divided into three categories – good, fair, and serious –
based on the threat they posed. Those in the serious category were spied on
the most, detained in more secure quarters, and sent to S-21 more quickly.
Good behavior could not move a detainee from one category to another.

All detainees were deprived of fundamental rights, such as freedom of
movement and speech. Healthcare was “almost non-existent.” S-24 detainees
were given slightly better food rations than prisoners at S-21 because they
needed some strength to work. While Duch claims he did not authorize
interrogation and torture at S-24, he believes his deputy, Comrade Hoy, may
have used such techniques without his knowledge.

At S-24, detainees were “subject to forced labor like animals.” Cadre forced
detainees to work in the rice fields at least eight hours a day, beating and
scolding them if they tried to rest. If there was sufficient moonlight,
sometimes they worked through the night. While rice production was the main
task, detainees also had to dig canals, cultivate vegetables, make jam, and
raise animals. When asked if detainees were sometimes forced to pull plows
like animals, Duch said “I cannot say no.” Children apparently worked
through the night searching for mice.

Detainees were also forced to attend weekly “criticism meetings” in which
they analyzed their own loyalty and that of their peers. Aside from this
view into the minds of detainees, cadre also monitored them and spied on
their personal conversations. When enough negative information was
collected, cadre reported to Duch who determined if detainees should be sent
to S-21 for interrogation or straight to Choeung Ek to be slaughtered. No
matter how hard they worked or how well they behaved, one by one all
detainees were smashed.

As with S-21 and Choeung Ek, Duch’s obvious strategy was to distance himself
from daily operations at S-24 as much as possible. Duch claims he only
visited S-24 four times and never inspected or observed the conditions. He
gained information only through weekly reports from Hoy. While his knowledge
of operations was lacking, his authority over S-24 was clear. He maintained
that the CPK upper echelon had the authority to arrest people and people
them to S-24, but once people were there Duch made the decisions. He
admitted that he alone decided whether cadre working at S-24 should be sent
to S-21 and whether detainees should be immediately slaughtered at Choeung
Ek rather than interrogated at S-21.

Many times each day Duch offers variations on the following: I did not see
it with my own eyes, but based on my analysis I conclude X might have
happened. Most of Duch’s testimony consists of his “conclusions” from and
“analysis” of surviving documents he has studied over the course of the
proceedings, rather than his personal recollections. In this way, his
opinion-based answers resemble expert testimony in an American court.

International Co-Prosecutor to Resign September 1st

After yesterday announcing his resignation due to “personal family matters”
effective September 1st, chief international co-prosecutor Robert Petit
appeared at the ECCC’s weekly press conference today to try to put the media
speculation to rest. He reiterated his reasons for leaving were completely
personal and had absolutely nothing to do with his responsibilities at the
court. Amid allegations he is leaving because of his disagreement with the
national co-prosecutor over whether to pursue more former Khmer Rouge
leaders, Petit urged the media not to read anything into his departure.

Petit opined that his departure will not have any effect on the court in
general and the Duch trial in particular. He explained that the Office of
Co-Prosecutors has used a team-approach to case development all along and
that his capable deputy is prepared to lead the team until further notice.
Moreover, Petit explained that his disagreement with the national
co-prosecutor has been fully briefed by both sides and submitted to the
Pre-Trial Chamber, which has all the information it requires to make a
ruling. Petit made an unspecific reference to other ad hoc international
tribunals, stating that they had all experienced changes in key personnel
and, with the exception of losing sitting judges, there had been no
significant impact on a case.

On a separate matter, Petit described some of the challenges faced by the
court. He called the ECCC “under-funded and under-resourced” for the tasks
with which it is entrusted. He opined that the court is still not doing a
good job communicating to the Cambodian people what it is doing and why, and
explained that it will be challenging for the court to leave a lasting and
meaningful legacy. He said the court also faces issues external to it.
Alluding to political interference by Cambodian officials, Petit said he
finds it “disturbing” that elected officials and other parties think they
can tell the court what it should do. It is widely believed Cambodian
officials instructed the national co-prosecutor not to pursue Khmer Rouge
leaders beyond the five already in process.

Public Affairs officials said they expect a new international co-prosecutor
to be appointed before Petit’s departure but refused to comment on who it
might be.